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automobile makes and models appeal to different cli-
enteles and that these clienteles have heterogeneous 
risk profiles and accident rates. As a result, insurers 
routinely price automotive insurance based on auto 
make and model. Also, before mortgage lenders origi-
nate loans, typically they have information on the un-
derlying assets (for example, a house) as well as the 
borrowers’ personal characteristics. Thus, informa-
tion about the underlying assets often plays a role in 
determining mortgage contract rates. Given the cur-
rent practices in the auto insurance market and mort-
gage market, the question naturally arises as to 
whether incorporating information on automobile 
make and model would help third party lenders refine 
their loan pricing models. Specifically, if we assume 
that the choice of auto make and model reveals individ-
ual financial (or credit) risk behavior of the borrower, 
what does this tell us about the borrower’s propensity 
to prepay or default on his loan?
Studying individual risk behavior in the auto loan 
market may be important for investors, as well as lend-
ers. Over the years, a growing percentage of the stock 
of automobile debt has been held in “asset-backed  
securities.” Pricing these contracts is complicated by 
Introduction and summary
Automobiles, meaning cars and light trucks, are the most 
commonly held nonfinancial assets among Americans. 
In 2001, the share of families that owned automobiles 
was over 84 percent—higher than the share that owned 
primary residences at 68 percent. Further, automobile 
ownership statistics are fairly stable across various 
demographic characteristics, such as income, age, race, 
employment, net worth, and homeownership. So how 
do we pay for all these automobiles? Roughly three-
quarters of automobile purchases are financed through 
credit, and loans for automobile purchases are one of 
the most common forms of household borrowing.1  
In 2003, debt outstanding on automobile loans was 
over $1,307 billion.2 According to past studies on 
auto sales, third party financing (direct loans) accounts 
for the largest portion of the automobile credit market, 
with dealer financing (indirect loans) second and 
leasing third.3
What are the risks that lenders in the automobile 
market face? The first, most obvious risk is default—
that is, the person who took out a loan to buy a car or 
truck fails to pay it back. A second significant risk for 
lenders in this market is prepayment risk—that is, the 
car or truck purchaser pays off the loan early, reduc-
ing the lender’s stream of interest payments. (Hereafter 
we use the terms automobiles, autos, and cars, as well 
as vehicles, interchangeably.) 
At present, the third party auto loan market relies 
on a “house rate” for pricing loans, such that all qual-
ified borrowers with similar risk characteristics pay 
the same rate. The lender does not rely on any infor-
mation about the automobile’s make and model to 
price the loan. Rather, the lender simply underwrites 
the loan based on the borrower’s credit score and re-
quired down payment.4 This contrasts with current 
practices in the auto insurance market and the mort-
gage market. Auto insurers have long recognized that 18 3Q/2008, Economic Perspectives
the borrower’s options to default and prepay, which 
are distinct but not independent. Thus, one cannot 
calculate accurately the economic value of the default 
option without simultaneously considering the finan-
cial incentive to prepay. 
In perfectly competitive markets, we expect well-
informed borrowers to make decisions about whether 
to pay their auto loans early or late (or on time) in a 
way that increases their wealth. For example, individ-
uals can increase their wealth by defaulting on an auto 
loan when the market value of the auto debt equals or 
exceeds the value of the automobile. Alternatively, 
individuals can prepay their auto loan to take advan-
tage of declining interest rates.5
In this article, we use a competing risks frame-
work to analyze the prepayment and default options 
on auto loans, using a large sample of such loans.  
To the best of our knowledge, there are two other 
studies, Heitfield and Sabarwal (2003) and Agarwal, 
Ambrose, and Chomsisengphet (2007), that provide 
competing risks models of default and prepayment  
of automobile loans. 
Here, we document several interesting patterns. 
For example, a loan on a new car has a higher proba-
bility of prepayment, whereas a loan on a used car 
has a higher probability of default. In addition, we 
find that a decrease in the credit risk of an auto loan hold-
er, as measured by the FICO (Fair Isaac Corporation) 
score, lowers the probability of default and raises the 
probability of prepayment. We also find that an in-
crease in the loan-to-value ratio (LTV) increases the 
probability of default and lowers the probability of 
prepayment. An increase in income raises the proba-
bility of prepayment, whereas a rise in unemployment 
increases the probability of default. And a decrease in 
the market rate (the three-year Treasury note rate) in-
creases both the probabilities of prepayment and de-
fault. These findings are roughly in line with what we 
would expect.
Interestingly, we also find that loans on most  
luxury automobiles have a higher probability of pre-
payment, while loans on most economy automobiles 
have a lower probability of default. This indicates that 
consumer choices regarding automobile make and 
model provide information about the probabilities of 
default and prepayment, even holding traditional risk 
factors (FICO score, LTV, and income) constant. 
In the next section, we describe our data. Then, 
we discuss our methodology and describe the regres-
sion results from the model for auto loan prepayment 
and default. 
Data 
The proprietary data that we analyze are from a 
large financial institution that originates direct auto-
mobile loans.6 We focus on direct loans in this article 
because this is the market where lenders compete.  
Direct loans are issued directly to the borrower, and 
indirect loans are issued through the dealer. In the case 
of indirect loans, financial institutions have agreements 
with automobile dealerships to provide loans at fixed 
interest rates. However, they have to compete with 
automobile finance companies that can provide the 
loans at a much cheaper rate, even if they have to 
bear a loss on the loans. For example, a General  
Motors Corporation (GM) finance company can af-
ford to take a loss on the financing for a GM automo-
bile while making a profit on the automobile sale. 
Hence, financial institutions cannot compete in the 
market for indirect automobile loans. 
 Our original sample consists of over 24,384  
direct auto loans. Auto loans are issued with four-year 
and five-year maturities as well as fixed rates. We ob-
serve the performance of these loans from January 
1998 through March 2003, such that a monthly re-
cord of each loan is maintained until the automobile 
loan is either paid in full (at loan maturity), prepaid, 
defaulted, or stays current. Certain accounts are 
dropped from the analysis for the following reasons: 
Loans were originated after March 2002; loans were 
written for the financial institution’s employees; and 
loans were associated with fraud or with stolen auto-
mobiles. We also drop loans that were paid in full. In 
addition, once the loan has been defaulted or has been 
prepaid, subsequent monthly records are removed 
from the data set. Finally, we have a total of 20,466 
loans with 4,730 prepayments (23.11 percent) and 
534 defaults (2.61 percent) during the study period.7
Loan characteristics include automobile value, 
automobile age, loan amount, LTV, monthly payments, 
contract rate, time of origination (year and month), 
and payoff year and month for prepayment and de-
fault. We also have access to the automobile make, 
model, and year. Finally, we know whether the loan 
was issued toward the purchase of a used or new au-
tomobile. Borrower characteristics include credit score 
(FICO score),8 monthly disposable income, and bor-
rower age. The market rate used in this analysis is the 
three-year Treasury note rate. We also include the un-
employment rate in the county of residence of the 
borrower. A majority of the loans originated in eight 
northeastern states—Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, 
and Rhode Island. 19 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
TaBlE 1
Summary statistics for auto loans at origination,
1998–2003
	 75	 	 25
	 percent	 	 percent
	 level	 Median	 level
Blue book value (dollars)  22,125  17,875  14,875
Loan amount (dollars)  20,544  14,027  10,547
Monthly payment (dollars)  318  229  158
Annual percentage rate  9.75  8.99  8.49
Monthly income (dollars)  5,062  3,416  2,357
FICO score  761  723  679
Loan-to-value ratio (percent)  92.86  78.47  70.90
Unemployment rate (percent)  5.40  4.50  2.60
Owner age (years)  50  40  31
Auto age (years)  7  4  1
Loan age (months)  50  54  59
Notes: Blue book value means an auto’s market value. FICO score means Fair Isaac 
Corporation score, which is a credit score with a range of 300–850 (see note 8 for 
further details).
TaBlE 2
Summary statistics for loans on all, used, and new autos
at origination, 1998–2003
  All	 Used	 New
	 autos	 autos	 autos
Blue book value (dollars)  17,875  14,283  28,382
Loan amount (dollars)  14,027  10,624  24,583
Monthly payment (dollars)  229  193  324
Annual percentage rate  8.99  9.00  8.74
Monthly income (dollars)  3,416  3,333  3,665
FICO score  723  722  726
Loan-to-value ratio (percent)  78.47  74.37  87.18
Unemployment rate (percent)  4.50  4.50  4.50
Owner age (years)  40  39  40
Auto age (years)  4  6  0
Loan age (months)  54  52  60
Notes: All values are medians. Blue book value means an auto’s market value.  
FICO score means Fair Isaac Corporation score, which is a credit score with a  
range of 300–850 (see note 8 for further details).
Next, table 2 compares these median 
statistics on all auto loans with the median 
statistics for loans on used cars, as well as 
loans on new cars. The median FICO 
scores are 722 and 726 for loans on used 
and new vehicles, respectively. The medi-
an LTV ranges from 74 percent for loans 
on used automobiles to 87 percent for loans 
on new automobiles. Finally, the median 
loan amount is about two and a half times 
for new cars as compared with that for 
used cars. These statistics reveal the dif-
ferences between the borrowers who buy 
new and used automobiles. Despite these 
differences, the credit risk characteristics 
between the borrowers for new versus 
used autos are not significantly different, 
as reflected by the similar FICO scores.
Table 3 presents the distribution of 
loans on used and new automobiles by 
loan outcome. The first row shows the 
number of loans that are current at the 
end of the sample period—that is, those 
that are not defaulted or prepaid. While 
20 percent of loans on used autos and  
32 percent of loans on new autos are pre-
paid, only 2.77 percent of loans on used 
vehicles and 2.13 percent of loans on new 
vehicles are defaulted.10 Overall, 75 per-
cent of all loans are originated for used 
cars and 25 percent are originated for new 
ones. The descriptive statistics show that 
a higher percentage of borrowers who 
have loans for new automobiles prepay, 
while a slightly higher percentage of bor-
rowers who have loans for used automo-
biles default. 
Table 4 presents the distribution of 
the auto loans across the various states. 
Thirty-three percent of the loans originat-
ed in New York, 22 percent in Massachusetts, and  
1 percent in Florida, while 3 percent originated across 
the 41 states (and the District of Columbia) not listed 
individually in the table.
Table 5 presents the distribution of the loan origi-
nation by quarter. Since most U.S. and European au-
tomobile manufacturers typically introduce the new 
versions of their established models (as well as brand 
new models) in the third quarter, 41 percent of all auto 
loans in the sample originated in that quarter. Next, 
26 percent of the loans originated in the first quarter. 
The earned income tax credit (EITC) refunds, which 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for all loans. 
The median loan amount is $14,027, with a median 
LTV of 78 percent and a median annual percentage 
rate (APR) of 8.99 percent. The median FICO score 
is 723 in our sample, which also happens to be the 
national median score in 2005 (see note 8). The median 
monthly disposable income is $3,416. Finally, the median 
owner, loan, and car ages are 40 years, 54 months, and  
4 years, respectively. The blue book value (the car’s 
market value)9 at loan origination ranges from $4,625 
to $108,000. These statistics are comparable with the 
overall statistics for a typical auto loan portfolio. 20 3Q/2008, Economic Perspectives
TaBlE 3
Loans on all, used, and new autos, by loan outcome, 1998–2003
	 All	autos	 Used	autos	 New	autos	
	 Number	 Percentage	 Number	 Percentage	 Number	 Percentage
Good accounts  15,202  74.28  11,843  77.20  3,359  65.54
Prepayment  4,730  23.11  3,073  20.03  1,657  32.33
Default  534  2.61  425  2.77  109  2.13
Total  20,466  100.00  15,341  100.00  5,125  100.00
Note: Good accounts are loans that are current at the end of the sample period—that is, those that are not defaulted or prepaid. 
TaBlE 4
Auto loans, by state, 1998–2003
State	 Number	 Percentage
Connecticut  3,256  15.91
Florida  199  0.97
Maine  782  3.82
Massachusetts  4,418  21.59
New Hampshire  1,099  5.37
New Jersey  2,536  12.39
New York  6,669  32.59
Pennsylvania  296  1.45
Rhode Island  643  3.14
Other states and 
 District of Columbia  568  2.78
Total  20,466  100.00
Note: The percentage column does not total because of rounding.
TaBlE 5
Loan originations for all, used, and new autos, by quarter, 1998–2003
	 All	autos	 Used	autos	 New	autos	
	 Number	 Percentage	 Number	 Percentage	 Number	 Percentage
First quarter  5,289  25.84  4,034  26.30  1,255  24.49
Second quarter  3,714  18.15  3,157  20.58  557  10.87
Third quarter  8,478  41.42  6,053  39.46  2,425  47.32
Fourth quarter  2,985  14.59  2,097  13.67  888  17.33
Total  20,466  100.00  15,341  100.00  5,125  100.00
Note: The percentage columns may not total because of rounding.
typically become available to recipients in the first 
quarter, might help explain why 26 percent of the 
loans originated then.11 Finally 18 percent of all auto 
loans originated in the second quarter, and 15 percent 
originated in the fourth quarter.12 Since a majority of 
the loans in our sample are for used car purchases, 
this suggests that consumers even tie their used auto-
mobile buying decisions to the introduction of the 
new automobiles. This is evident from the distribution 
of the loans for used car purchases by quarter. The dis-
tribution is fairly similar to that of the loans for new 
car purchases. Finally, table 6 provides a distribution 
of the auto loans by auto make. Loans on Chevy  
automobiles constitute the largest percentage, and 
those on Jaguar and Porsche automobiles constitute 
the smallest shares. 
Variables
In our regression results for default and prepay-
ment, the dependent variable can take on the follow-
ing values: Current = 0, prepay = 1, and default = 2. 
We regress this variable against a variety of indepen-
dent variables that control for the economic environ-
ment as well as various borrower risk factors.
We first isolate variables to capture the prepay-
ment option. To approximate the prepayment option, 
we follow the approach outlined in Calhoun and Deng 
(2002) and construct an auto loan prepayment premi-
um that is defined as PPOptiont–6 = (rct–6 – rmt–6 )/(rmt–6), 
where rct–6 is the coupon rate on the existing auto loan 
and rmt–6 is the three-year Treasury note rate.13 We ex-
pect PPOptiont–6 to be positively related to prepay-
ment behavior—that is, consumers are more likely to 
prepay and trade in their cars with the decline in the 
prevailing three-year Treasury note rate relative to the 
original loan coupon rate. 
To determine the impact of differences in auto  
depreciation rates on loan termination probabilities, 
we estimated the depreciation schedule for each auto 
manufacturer based on the five-year market values  
for autos reported by the National Automobile Dealers  21 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
TaBlE 6




Acura  608  3.0
Audi  270  1.3
BMW  538  2.6
Buick  475  2.3
Cadillac  573  2.8
Chevy  2,097  10.2
Chrysler  390  1.9
Dodge  1,342  6.6
Geo  467  2.3
General Motors  449  2.2
Honda  1,919  9.4
Hyundai  125  0.6
Infinity  218  1.1
Isuzu  157  0.8
Jaguar  78  0.4
Jeep  1,591  7.8
Lexus  187  0.9
Lincoln  283  1.4
Mazda  400  2.0
Mercedes-Benz  722  3.5
Mitsubishi  433  2.1
Nissan  1,674  8.2
Oldsmobile  386  1.9
Plymouth  358  1.7
Pontiac  628  3.1
Porsche  75  0.4
Rover  147  0.7
Saab  286  1.4
Saturn  293  1.4
Subaru  340  1.7
Toyota  1,963  9.6
Volkswagen  994  4.9
Total  20,466  100.0
Notes: BMW means Bayerische Motoren Werke (Bavarian Motor 
Works). The percentage column does not total because of rounding.
cars will vary based on the idiosyncratic driving hab-
its of the borrowers. 
Based on these estimated changes in car prices, 
we construct the monthly loan-to-value ratio (CLTV). 
We expect the monthly loan-to-value ratio to be posi-
tively related to default probability because the high-
er depreciation in the auto value (holding other things 
constant) serves to increase the loan-to-value ratio. 
Given the significant depreciation in auto value upon 
purchase, many borrowers have an auto loan balance 
greater than the current car value. Thus, including CLTV 
allows for a direct test for the link between auto quality 
and credit performance. That is, if an auto manufac-
turer produces a disproportionate number of low- 
quality cars, then the secondary market value for the 
manufacturer’s cars will reflect this lower quality.
In addition to changes in the auto value relative 
to the debt burden, we also capture changes in bor-
rower credit constraints via the time-varying borrow-
er credit score (FICO). Borrower credit history is one 
of the key determinants of auto loan approval. Thus, 
we expect the FICO score to be negatively related to 
default probability, implying that borrowers with 
lower current FICO scores are more likely to default 
on their auto loans.14
Local economic conditions may also affect bor-
rower loan termination decisions. For example, bor-
rowers facing possible job losses are more likely to 
default because they may be unable to continue mak-
ing loan payments. We use the county unemployment 
rate (Unemployment), updated monthly, as a proxy 
for local economic conditions; the unemployment 
rate is for the county of residence of the borrower.  
Finally, we include a series of dummy variables that 
denote the borrower’s location (state) to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity in local economic conditions. 
We also control for other variables, such as the 
age of the borrower, state-specific effects, account 
seasoning (time since loan origination), and calendar 
time effects. Lastly, we also control for the make, 
model, and year of the automobile. It is well docu-
mented that different auto makes and models have 
different depreciation functions, so an auto make 
dummy will help isolate the auto make’s specific  
depreciation. For example, Aizcorbe, Corrado, and 
Doms (2000) and Corrado, Dunn, and Otoo (2003) 
use fixed effects models by assigning dummy vari-
ables for each automobile make, which can be used 
as a proxy for the measurement of the physical char-
acteristics of the automobile make. Since the charac-
teristics of an automobile are fixed, the dummy 
variables capture the cross-sectional variation in the 
auto’s market values. 
Association (NADA) on its website (www.nada.com). 
For example, to determine the average expected de-
preciation for Subaru cars, we collected the estimated 
market value during the fall of 2003 for Subaru’s base-
level Forester, Impreza, and Legacy models from the 
1998 model year through the 2002 model year. This 
provides a rough estimate of the yearly change in val-
ue for a base-level model experiencing an average 
driving pattern (as determined by the NADA). For each 
model, we then calculate the simple yearly deprecia-
tion experienced by the base car model (without con-
sidering possible upgrades or add-ons), and we average 
the expected depreciation by manufacturer. Unfortu-
nately, given the heterogeneous nature of the models 
from year to year, we are unable to match all models 
to a set of used car values. Thus, we assumed that all 
models for each manufacturer follow a similar depre-
ciation schedule. Obviously, our valuation algorithm 
is only an approximation, since the values of individual 22 3Q/2008, Economic Perspectives
Methodology
Using a loan-level model, we empirically evaluate 
the effect of market changes in interest rate exposure 
on prepayment risk for an automobile loan portfolio. 
We also do this for the effect of liquidity constraints—
as measured by FICO scores—and the effect of unem-
ployment on default risk. Previous empirical prepayment 
and default models using loan-level data are typically 
based on techniques of survival analysis (originally 
used in biological studies of mortality).15 Kalbfleisch 
and Prentice (1980) and Cox and Oakes (1984) pro-
vide a classic statistical treatment of the topic. For 
further details, see the appendix. 
Since our primary purpose is to determine how 
borrower consumption decisions can affect loan per-
formance, we follow Gross and Souleles (2002) and 
separate xj into components representing borrower 
risk characteristics, economic conditions, and con-
sumption characteristics. Specifically, we assume that
 
1)  ′ = + + + + x State risk econ car j j t i it it it β β τ β β β β 0 1 2 3 4 ,  
 
where τt represents a series of dummy variables cor-
responding to calendar quarters that allow for shifts 
over time in the propensity to default or prepay; Statei 
represents a series of dummy variables corresponding 
to the state of residence of the borrower; riskit repre-
sents a set of borrower characteristics, including cred-
it score, that reflect the lender’s underwriting  
criteria; econit is a set of variables capturing changes 
in local economic conditions; and carit is a set of  
variables identifying information concerning the type 
of car purchased. 
Empirical results
We look at the results from the competing risks 
model that capture the determinants of auto loan pre-
payment and default. Table 7 presents the results.16 
We control for state dummies, loan age, owner age, 
and quarter time dummies. 
The results (estimated coefficients) in the first 
column of data show that the probability of default is 
higher in the first, second, third, and fourth quarters 
of 2000. However, the probability of default is lower 
in the first and second quarters of 1999. Also, the re-
sults in the fourth column show the probability of pre-
payment is higher in the first, second, third, and fourth 
quarters of 2002, but the probability of prepayment is 
lower in the fourth quarter of 2000. These results high-
light the effects of macroeconomic conditions on default 
and prepayment probabilities. Because of weakening 
macroeconomic conditions in 2000, there were more 
defaults and fewer prepayments. However, with dropping 
interest rates and subsequent attractive automobile  
offers—some of which featured no closing costs, zero 
percent financing, and no down payment—prepayment 
and trade-in rates in 2002 were much higher. These 
results are consistent with the literature on consumer 
durable goods purchases, transactions costs, and liquidi-
ty constraints.17
Next, we look at the automaker control variables. 
The competing risks model contains 31 dummy vari-
ables denoting the various automakers. The estimated 
coefficients provide interesting insights into the pre-
payment and default behavior of the borrowers with 
respect to the makes of the automobiles they eventu-
ally purchase. Specifically, we find that loans for 
most luxury automobile makes, such as Lexus, BMW, 
and Cadillac, have a higher probability of prepayment, 
while loans for most economy automobile makes, such 
as Geo, Buick, and Honda, have a lower probability of 
default. It is interesting that some luxury automobiles 
(for example, Jaguar and Saab) have higher probabili-
ties of default and prepayment. This implies that cer-
tain luxury automobiles have a premium in the used 
car market; luxury vehicles in the used car market are 
preferred by liquidity-constrained consumers. 
We interpret the results from the ninth and tenth 
rows (Owner age and Owner age2 ) of table 7, and find 
that younger borrowers (those below the median age of 
40) have a higher probability of default than the older 
borrowers (those at the median age of 40 and above). 
We also find that the older borrowers have a higher prob-
ability of prepayment than their younger counterparts. 
The results also confirm that younger borrowers are 
liquidity constrained and thus more likely to own a 
used automobile. Account seasoning (time since loan 
origination) increases both the probabilities of default 
and prepayment—our interpretation of the results 
from the eleventh and twelfth rows (Loan age and 
Loan age2) of table 7. These results are intuitive.
Finally, we look at some of the important deter-
minants of default and prepayment as indicated by 
the option value theory. First, the results show that 
the auto loan prepayment premium (PPOptiont–6) is 
positive and statistically significant for the probability 
of prepayment and also, surprisingly, for the proba-
bility of default. The first result indicates that the 
higher the difference between the auto loan rate and 
the market rate is, the higher the probability of pre-
payment and trade-in. Again, this result is consistent 
with the literature on consumer durable goods pur-
chases. A trade-in at lower interest rates both lowers 
the monthly payments out of disposable income and 
increases the share of durable goods in household 
wealth. However, it is a little surprising that a bigger 23 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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Competing risks model of auto loan termination through default and prepayment
	 Default	 Prepayment
	 Coefficient	 Standard	 	 Coefficient	 Standard	 	
	 value	 error	 p	value	 value	 error	 p	value
Intercept  6.8050  0.6265  0.0001  –5.3690  0.3243  0.0001
New auto dummy  –0.0261  0.0113  0.0224  0.0540  0.0258  0.0331
Monthly incomet0   /1,000  –0.0200  0.0170  0.3608  0.0280  0.0072  0.0001
FICOt–6  –0.0166  0.0004  0.0001  0.0010  0.0003  0.0001
Unemploymentt–6  0.2262  0.0783  0.0039  0.1613  0.0414  0.0001
CLTVt–6  1.0110  0.2958  0.0006  1.4485  0.1338  0.0001
Paymentt–6  0.0002  0.0001  0.0166  0.0002  0.0000  0.0001
PPOptiont–6  0.2917  0.0754  0.0001  0.0419  0.0178  0.0380
Owner age  –0.0941  0.0137  0.0001  –0.0338  0.0066  0.0001
Owner age2  0.0009  0.0002  0.0001  0.0003  0.0001  0.0001
Loan age  0.0316  0.0147  0.0311  0.1293  0.0083  0.0001
Loan age2  –0.0013  0.0002  0.0001  0.0023  0.0002  0.0001
1999:Q1 dummy  –0.4023  0.2131  0.0591  0.1148  0.0796  0.1492
1999:Q2 dummy  –0.5659  0.2080  0.0065  0.0029  0.0803  0.9714
1999:Q3 dummy  0.0793  0.1726  0.6459  0.1267  0.0761  0.0962
1999:Q4 dummy  0.1832  0.1722  0.2876  –0.1608  0.0825  0.0514
2000:Q1 dummy  0.3297  0.1727  0.0562  –0.0198  0.0824  0.8100
2000:Q2 dummy  0.3799  0.1782  0.0331  0.9646  0.0695  0.0001
2000:Q3 dummy  0.4669  0.1892  0.0136  0.0047  0.0905  0.9586
2000:Q4 dummy  0.5381  0.1905  0.0047  –0.3303  0.1005  0.0010
2001:Q1 dummy  0.1727  0.2017  0.3919  –0.1096  0.0983  0.2650
2001:Q2 dummy  0.3351  0.1927  0.0821  0.0978  0.0942  0.2989
2001:Q3 dummy  0.1187  0.1909  0.5340  –0.0554  0.0990  0.5755
2001:Q4 dummy  0.2523  0.1711  0.1402  0.4236  0.0842  0.0001
2002:Q1 dummy  0.1721  0.1588  0.2784  0.1738  0.0933  0.0625
2002:Q2 dummy  –0.0476  0.1628  0.7701  0.2261  0.0967  0.0194
2002:Q3 dummy  0.2841  0.1579  0.0720  0.3618  0.0891  0.0001
2002:Q4 dummy  0.1600  0.1567  0.3072  0.4911  0.0863  0.0001
Connecticut dummy  –0.3784  0.1035  0.0003  –0.5174  0.0505  0.0001
Florida dummy  0.3926  0.2116  0.0636  –0.2428  0.1551  0.1175
Maine dummy  –0.3781  0.1885  0.0449  –0.1795  0.0846  0.0339
New Hampshire dummy  –0.7172  0.1870  0.0001  –0.1575  0.0677  0.0200
New Jersey dummy  –0.4121  0.1482  0.0054  –0.1850  0.0672  0.0059
New York dummy  0.1724  0.1406  0.2201  –0.2060  0.0785  0.0087
Pennsylvania dummy  –0.5487  0.4691  0.2421  –0.2002  0.1775  0.2595
Rhode Island dummy  0.0493  0.1593  0.7570  –0.2028  0.0962  0.0350
Acura dummy  –0.4570  0.2379  0.0547  0.0951  0.1089  0.3828
Audi dummy  –1.7109  0.7163  0.0169  0.3795  0.1553  0.0145
BMW dummy  –0.1186  0.2486  0.6334  0.4202  0.0969  0.0001
Buick dummy  –1.0463  0.4209  0.0129  –0.1134  0.1158  0.3272
Cadillac dummy  0.2226  0.2694  0.4087  0.3811  0.1233  0.0020
Chevy dummy  –0.1028  0.1296  0.4275  0.1509  0.1586  0.3241
Chrysler dummy  –0.1220  0.3140  0.6976  0.2540  0.2335  0.3121
Dodge dummy  0.3696  0.1240  0.0029  0.1048  0.0691  0.1295
Geo dummy  –1.3232  0.7141  0.0639  –0.2126  0.2185  0.3305
General Motors dummy  –0.1937  0.2665  0.4672  0.2865  0.2008  0.3234
Honda dummy  –0.3666  0.1407  0.0092  –0.0533  0.0686  0.4369
Hyundai dummy  –0.4782  0.4664  0.3052  –0.1337  0.2423  0.5812
Infinity dummy  –0.4485  0.4590  0.3286  0.3301  0.1558  0.0404
Isuzu dummy  0.2555  0.2619  0.3292  –0.0585  0.1777  0.7419
Jaguar dummy  1.1264  0.5201  0.0303  0.7451  0.3425  0.0296
Jeep dummy  –0.0876  0.1508  0.5615  0.0910  0.0711  0.2008
Lexus dummy  0.0036  0.2906  0.9902  0.6604  0.1302  0.0001
Lincoln dummy  0.5613  0.2093  0.0073  0.1187  0.1241  0.3388
Mazda dummy  0.1673  0.1734  0.3344  –0.1009  0.1149  0.3798
Mercedes-Benz dummy  0.3848  0.1656  0.0201  0.0950  0.0908  0.2953
Mitsubishi dummy  0.0848  0.1833  0.6437  0.1854  0.0998  0.0633
Nissan dummy  –0.1012  0.1368  0.4596  –0.0020  0.0730  0.977924 3Q/2008, Economic Perspectives
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Competing risks model of auto loan termination through default and prepayment
Oldsmobile dummy  0.0114  0.2588  0.9647  –0.0152  0.1196  0.8988
Plymouth dummy  –0.1911  0.2723  0.4828  –0.0039  0.1213  0.9744
Pontiac dummy  0.4209  0.1408  0.0028  0.0680  0.0933  0.4665
Rover dummy  0.4033  0.5117  0.4306  0.2235  0.2367  0.3451
Saab dummy  0.6634  0.2367  0.0051  0.3294  0.1153  0.0043
Saturn dummy  –0.3285  0.2982  0.2707  –0.0927  0.1454  0.5235
Subaru dummy  –0.5246  0.3898  0.1784  0.0388  0.1343  0.7726
Toyota dummy  –0.0780  0.1376  0.5707  –0.1041  0.0688  0.1305
Volkswagen dummy  –0.1601  0.1741  0.3579  0.1278  0.0759  0.0922
Log likelihood ratio  1,389               
Number of accounts  20,466  534        4,730   
Notes: FICO score means Fair Isaac Corporation score, which is a credit score with a range of 300–850 (see note 8 for further details). LTV means 
loan-to-value ratio. BMW means Bayerische Motoren Werke (Bavarian Motor Works). Porsche is excluded from the regression analysis because there 
are no defaults on loans for Porsches in the sample.
	 Default	 Prepayment
	 Coefficient	 Standard	 	 Coefficient	 Standard	 	
	 value	 error	 p	value	 value	 error	 p	value
difference in the loan rate and the market rate also in-
creases the probability of default. One possible expla-
nation is that liquidity-constrained consumers, who have 
bad credit risk profiles, are priced out of the low mar-
ket rates, but the option to default remains valuable.  
Monthly payments, or the debt service burden 
(Paymentt–6), are also positively related to both the 
probability of prepayment and probability of default. 
We expect that a higher debt service burden for li-
quidity-constrained consumers could lead to a higher 
probability of default; however, it could also lead to  
a higher probability of prepayment for consumers 
who do not have liquidity constraints.18 Monthly in-
come (Monthly incomet0) is negatively related to de-
fault but positively related to prepayment. This result 
is consistent with theory. The county unemployment 
rate (Unemploymentt–6) is positively related to both 
the probabilities to default and prepay. Once again we 
expect a higher unemployment rate to lead to a higher 
default probability, but higher unemployment could 
also lead some to prepay and cash out equity from 
their automobiles. These results are largely consistent 
with Heitfield and Sabarwal (2003).
Next, we look at the monthly loan-to-value ratio 
(CLTVt–6), the FICO score (FICOt–6), and the new 
auto indicator. All three of these are measures of li-
quidity constraints. As expected, liquidity-constrained 
consumers are more likely to have a high LTV and a 
low FICO score, and they are more likely to buy used 
automobiles. The results show that the FICO score is 
negatively related to default probability, LTV is posi-
tively related to default probability, and the new auto 
indicator is negatively related to default probability. 
Moreover, a higher FICO score and a new auto indi-
cator lead to a higher probability of prepayment, and 
a higher LTV leads to a higher probability of prepay-
ment. (Heitfield and Sabarwal [2003] do not control 
for LTV, FICO, automobile age, automobile make, and 
income, so we cannot compare our results with theirs.) 
Marginal effects
Table 8 presents the marginal effect of a borrower 
owning a new automobile on prepayment and default 
rates of auto loans over a 30-month period. This table 
also shows the marginal effects of changes in FICO 
score, LTV, auto loan prepayment premium, income, 
and county unemployment rate on the prepayment 
and default rates of automobile loans over a 30-month 
span. The results show that a borrower owning a new 
automobile reduces the probability of default by as 
much as 15 percent but raises the probability of pre-
payment by 13 percent. An increase of 20 points in 
the FICO score lowers the probability of default by 
12 percent but raises the probability of prepayment by 
8 percent. These results suggest that an increase in the 
credit risk profile or an ease in liquidity constraints 
reduces one type of hazard (default) but increases  
another type of hazard (prepayment). A 5 percent 
drop in LTV reduces the probability of default by  
4 percent but increases the probability of prepayment 
by 7 percent. This would indicate that a drop in LTV 
raises the overall wealth of the household. Next we 
note that a 10 percent increase in income raises the  
probability of prepayment by 8 percent. These results 
are consistent with the theoretical literature on  
consumer durable goods purchases and liquidity  25 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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Marginal effects on auto loan termination through default  
and prepayment over a 30-month period
		 Default	 Prepayment
  (percent)  (percent)
New auto   –15  13
FICO score increase by 20 points  –12  8
Loan-to-value ratio 
  decrease by 5 percent  –4  7
Auto loan prepayment premium
  increase by 1 percent  3  6
Income increase by 10 percent  0  8
County unemployment rate 
  increase by 1 percent  9  3
Notes: FICO score means Fair Isaac Corporation score, which is a credit score with 
a range of 300–850 (see note 8 for further details). For details on the calculation of 
the auto loan prepayment premium, see p. 20. The county unemployment rate  
is for the county of residence of the borrower.
constraints (Eberly, 1994). A 1 percent increase in the 
county unemployment rate significantly increases the 
probability of default by as much as 9 percent. This is 
a fairly striking result and suggests that liquidity con-
straints can significantly increase default rates. Finally, 
a 1 percent decrease in the market interest rate in rela-
tion to the auto loan annual percentage rate—that is,  
a 1 percent increase in the auto loan prepayment pre-
mium—increases prepayment probability by 6 percent. 
The results also suggest that the decrease in the market 
rate will increase the probability of default by 3 percent. 
One possible explanation for these results could be 
that liquidity-constrained consumers may not be able 
to get favorable interest rates on their loans. 
Conclusion
Automobiles are highly visible consumption goods 
that are often purchased on credit. In this article, we 
use a unique proprietary data set of individual auto-
mobile loans to assess whether borrower consumption 
choice reveals information about future loan perfor-
mance. Given that individual self-selection is evident 
in the automobile market (as in the auto insurance 
market and the mortgage market), a natural question 
arises as to whether this self-selection also reveals in-
formation about the consumer’s propensity to prepay 
or default on an auto loan. We adopt the competing 
risks framework to analyze these auto loan prepayment 
and default risks empirically, using a 
sample of 20,466 individual loans that 
were issued toward the purchases of both 
new and used automobiles. 
Our results can be summarized as 
follows. A loan on a new car has a higher 
probability of prepayment, whereas a loan 
on a used car has a higher probability of 
default. A decrease in the credit risk of a 
loan holder, as measured by the FICO 
score, lowers the probability of auto loan 
default and raises the probability of pre-
payment. An increase in the LTV increas-
es the probability of default and lowers 
the probability of prepayment. An increase 
in income raises the probability of pre-
payment, whereas a rise in unemploy-
ment increases the probability of default. 
A decrease in the market rate (the three-
year Treasury note rate) increases both the 
probabilities of prepayment and default. And perhaps 
most interestingly, we also find that loans on most lux-
ury automobiles have a higher probability of prepay-
ment, while loans on most economy automobiles have 
a lower probability of default. 
Clearly, this study has some limitations. We are 
only looking at direct auto loans that were originated, 
for the most part, in Northeast states by a single lend-
er. However, our results imply that lenders could im-
prove the pricing of automobile loans by considering 
the type of car collateralizing the loan. Although the 
use of auto make/model information in loan pricing is 
probably not feasible because of the multitude of make/
model combinations, the results from this study suggest 
that controlling for differences in default and prepay-
ment patterns based on broader auto types (for example, 
luxury versus economy) could improve loan pricing.26 3Q/2008, Economic Perspectives
1Aizcorbe, Kennickell, and Moore (2003), pp. 16–17, 19; Aizcorbe, 
Starr, and Hickman (2003) report that in 2001 over 80 percent of 
new vehicle transactions were financed through loans or leases.
2See the Federal Reserve’s G.19 statistical release  
(www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/Current). While this release 
also includes debt on mobile homes, education, boats, trailers, or 
vacations, a vast majority of the debt is on automobiles.
3For example, based on a sample of auto sales in southern California 
between September 1999 and October 2000, Dasgupta, Siddarth, 
and Silva-Risso (2003) report that 24 percent of the transactions 
were leased, 35 percent were financed through auto dealers, and 
the remaining 40 percent were most likely financed from third  
party lenders (credit unions or banks). 
4For example, a borrower with an acceptable credit score may be 
offered a loan up to $20,000 conditional on making a 5 percent 
down payment. Thus, if the borrower purchases an $18,000 car,  
the lender provides a $17,100 loan.
5Over the years, several studies using loan-level data have investi-
gated the economic drivers of default and prepayment risks on  
residential mortgages. See Kau et al. (1992, 1995); Deng (1997); 
Deng and Quigley (2002); Deng, Quigley, and Van Order (2000); 
Pavlov (2001); Calhoun and Deng (2002); and Ambrose and 
Sanders (2003).
6We obtained the sample and permission to use it for our article 
from a large financial institution under the condition that we keep 
the institution’s identity confidential.
7In our sample, prepayment is defined as an account that pays off 
the loan in full before loan maturity, while a default is defined as 
60 days past due. We tried alternative definitions for both prepay-
ment ($2,000, $3,000, and $4,000) and default (90 days past due). 
However, the results are qualitatively the same. Since financial  
institutions try to repossess the automobile once the account is  
60 days past due, our definition is consistent with current practice. 
8FICO scores have a range of 300–850. In 2005, the median FICO 
score was 723 (see www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/ 
05_48/b3961124.htm). Typically, a FICO score above 800 is con-
sidered very good, while a score below 620 is considered poor. As 
reported on the Fair Isaac Corporation website (www.myfico.com), 
there is a 400-basis-point interest rate spread for a 15-year home 
equity loan between borrowers with FICO scores above 760 and 
those with scores below 580; those with the higher FICO scores 
obtain a loan with a lower interest rate. 
9The Kelley Blue Book, produced by the Kelley Blue Book 
Company Incorporated, has become so authoritative and popular 
that the term “blue book value” has become synonymous with a 
car’s market value. 
10According to the American Bankers Association (ABA), the na-
tional delinquency rate of 30 days past due for all direct automobile 
loans was 2.4 percent in 2002. This statistic is consistent with the 
default rates in table 3. It is interesting to note that the delinquency 
rate for indirect automobile loans was around 1.9 percent in 2002. 
The lower delinquency rates for indirect loans can be explained as 
follows. The ABA does not report the loan performance information 
for auto finance companies and financial institutions that compete 
in the indirect loans market and that have very stringent origination 
guidelines. This highlights the point that a study on automobile de-
faults should distinguish between direct and indirect loans. 
11Goodman-Bacon and McGranahan (2008) document that EITC 
eligible households receive over 80 percent of the EITC payments, 
which averaged $2,113 in 2004, in the first quarter of the year. 
They also show that these households tend to spend a sizable por-
tion of their EITC refunds on automobile purchases.
12The distributions of loan origination for both new and used auto-
mobiles are similar.
13We lag the three-year Treasury note rate by six months to avoid en-
dogeneity. We also conduct  similar analyses with both five-year 
and one-year Treasury note rates; the results are qualitatively simi-
lar. In fact, we lag all other variables by six months as well.
14In a separate regression, we also include the square terms of 
CLTV and FICO to control for any nonlinearity in explaining 
the prepayment and default rates. These results are not reported  
in this article.
15These techniques have also found frequent application in industrial 
engineering failure time studies.
16We conducted an exhaustive robustness test by including quadratic 
specifications for the various risk variables, discrete dummies for 
some of the continuous variables, and log transformations. Though 
the results are not reported, they are qualitatively similar.
17Accordingly, about half of the households adjust their durable 
stock to a target share of their total wealth and then allow it to de-
preciate until it reaches a critical share of wealth; at this point they 
purchase a new durable good so that the stock once again equals 
the target share of wealth (Attanasio, 1995; and Attanasio, Goldberg, 
and Kyriazidou, 2000).
18Heitfield and Sabarwal (2003) find debt service coverage to be 
positively related to default but negatively related to prepayment.
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APPENDIX
In automobile loan termination analysis, we consider 
that loans “die” prior to scheduled maturity from either 
default or prepayment. Survival data consist of not only 
a response variable that measures the duration of a par-
ticular event but also a set of independent variables that 
may explain duration of a particular event. We use dura-
tion models to analyze the underlying distribution of the 
failure time variable and to assess the effect of various 
explanatory variables of the failure time. Duration mod-
els estimate the probability of a particular terminating 
event of the real world. Hazard models are a type of du-
ration model that deals with events that may happen at 
various times in the future. 
Let prepayment or default be the termination events 
of an automobile loan. A loan given in period t0 has dif-
ferent probabilities of prepayment and default in one 
year, two years, … , t years. In duration analysis, we are 
interested in describing the probability distribution of 
observed automobile loan duration across an individual 
loan. The basic idea behind the hazard model is that it 
estimates the conditional probabilities of prepayment 
and default at time t, assuming payments are being made 
from loan inception up to time t – 1, conditional on the 
baseline hazard as well as other factors affecting the 
prepayment and default behavior of the auto owner. 
Hence, we include explanatory variables for factors that 
could affect the probabilities of prepayment and default, 
such as LTV and FICO score. 
Let τ be a random variable describing time to exit 
(in months since origination) due to prepayment or de-
fault. Let p(τ < t) = F(t), ∀t ≥ 0 be the distribution func-
tion of τ at time t. Let f(t) = dF/dt be the probability den-
sity function for τ. Then, we can define the hazard func-
tion (the probability of a loan terminating) at time t  
with the following equation:
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represents a differential equation in t with the following 
solution,












   
This gives the survivor function,  F t ( ), and the distribu-
tion function,  F t F t ( ) ( ), = − 1  of τ in terms of the haz-
ard function, h(t). From equations A1 and A2, we obtain 
the unconditional density function of τ:
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The parametric specification of the hazard function (log-
logistic functional form) is as follows. Substituting 
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Covariates are introduced in the model by setting 
λ β = − ′ exp( ), x where x is a matrix of independent vari-
ables (FICOt–6, CLTVt–6, PPOptiont–6, Unemploymentt–6, 
etc.) and β is a vector of parameters to be estimated.  
Gamma (g) is an ancillary parameter also estimated from 
the data. Estimation is by maximum likelihood allowing  
for right-side censoring and left-side truncation. 28 3Q/2008, Economic Perspectives
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